

School Inclusion As A Large-Scale Reform: Trajectories Of Change In Private Subsidized Schools In Chile 2015-2020

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Abstract

Since 2015, Chile has adopted a policy of school inclusion by regulating the state-subsidized private school sector, in order to raise the levels of equity and social mix of the educational system. For this purpose, the reform initiated centralizes the admission processes, prohibits the lucrative spirit in schools, and replaces the mandatory charge to families. This article aims to explore the early stages of this large-scale reform, based on a typological construction characterizing the routes of institutional change in which the trajectories of action of schools are inserted in a context of modifications to the regulatory framework. The study has a quantitative descriptive exploratory design and was based on the analysis of 3,778 schools in the subsidized private sector that offer some form of school education in Chile. Among the main results, the response patterns to the School Inclusion Law are of a systemic nature and are classified into four types of change trajectories in schools in the subsidized private sector, generating adjustments between sectors and subsectors, as well as a redefinition of the private provision of school education.

Keywords : educational reform; equity; including schools; educational policy; politics.

1. Introduction

The problem addressed in this article constitutes a dimension of growing interest for educational policies: how the response patterns of schools are structured with respect to changes in regulatory contexts, especially those that promote higher levels of socio-educational inclusion. Taking into account this purpose, this article reports on a national trajectory of regulatory policy with emphasis on educational establishments at the primary and/or secondary school level, exploring the first stages of the educational reform initiated in Chile between the years 2015-2020. process that responds to expectations of change in the way school provision is organized and the role of the subsidized private sector in particular ¹.

In the early 1980s, Chile developed one of the most ambitious policies based on school choice, introducing a universal demand financing scheme through subsidies to families, thus generating strong incentives for the formation of a private school sector. subsidized by the State (Bellei, 2015). Based on these reforms, educational provision is organized in a decentralized public sector managed by local governments (at the communal level), a sector of private schools subsidized by the State, private schools financed exclusively by families and schools of delegated administration. that were transferred to productive unions. Since then, the subsidized private sector has grown significantly, reaching a significant degree of institutionalization and becoming the main provision of the school system (Corvalán et al., 2009). In practice, these educational policies raised the dynamics of competition and school choice in the educational system, providing broad powers to subsidized private schools to establish the type of educational offer and directly or indirectly select the profile of students they admit.

Comparative experience highlights that the effects of school choice programs on the achievement of the objectives of educational systems are strongly related to the

type of specific regulation that allows private schools to be susceptible to receiving public financing (Boeskens, 2016; Zancajo et al. al., 2021). Therefore, regulatory frameworks are a central factor in inhibiting the undesirable effects of the expansion of private provision and school choice. In this way, regulatory policies aimed at private schools in school education are an aspect that receives increasing attention, both among researchers and decision makers (Boeskens, 2016; Zancajo, 2019; Zancajo et al., 2021).

There is controversy in the educational debate about whether the expansion of the subsidized private sector has contributed to equity objectives, or if, ultimately, it represents an aggregate improvement of the educational system (Tokman, 2002; Almonacid, 2004; Bellei, 2015 ; Falabella, 2015). The evidence confirms concerns about the permanent effects of the expansion of private provision on the socioeconomic stratification of the education system and warns about high levels of school segregation (OECD, 2004, 2017). In fact, after an intensive cycle of reforms to the school system, Chile presents one of the highest levels of socioeconomic segregation of its school population in the international context (Bellei, 2007).

In 2015, a regulatory policy (School Inclusion Law) was adopted that seeks greater control of selection practices and reduce economic barriers to access to subsidized schools, increasing the levels of equity, inclusion and social mix of the educational system (Muñoz and Weinstein, 2019).

In this sense, it is important to highlight that the concepts of inclusion and equity have been established in the discussion of public policies in education. Some of the milestones that mark the chronology of this inclusive turn in educational policy are given by:

- 1990: United Nations “Education for All” Campaign, which aims to proactively identify obstacles to accessing educational opportunities, where the prioritized groups are those groups exposed to conditions of social disadvantage such as young people from rural areas or ethnic minorities (UNESCO, 2005).
- 1994: Salamanca Conference where it is established that orientation towards inclusion in schools is one of the most effective measures to combat discriminatory attitudes, build a more inclusive society, more open communities and achieve good educational results for all (Cruz, 2019).
- 2008: IBE-UNESCO International Conference on Education “Inclusive Education: the path to the Future”, where the need to incorporate the concept and practice of inclusive education in national educational policies is reaffirmed, with the purpose of addressing the causes and effects of social exclusion linked to class, ethnicity, religion, gender, race, among others (Martínez-Usarralde, 2021).
- 2015: The Incheon Declaration of the World Education Forum in South Korea. It constitutes the continuity of the “Education for All” movement and highlights the need to expand the notions of educational access and equality. The declaration establishes Education 2030: Framework for Action that integrates the gender equality perspective (Díaz-Noguera, 2021).
- 2019: UNESCO International Forum “Every Student Counts”, which emphasizes the need to expand the notion of educational inclusion and its guiding nature to advance equal access to educational opportunities (Rodríguez, 2020).

Now, the notion of educational inclusion is not static, but is nourished by different traditions and conceptual frameworks, in such a way that it can convey various meanings and practices. Although between the sixties and eighties the roots of the

debate around educational inclusion go back to the field of special educational needs or studies on urban and residential segregation (Rojas and Falabella, 2016), already in the nineties and early In the 2000s, certain conceptual distinctions were raised to better understand the implications of educational inclusion.

Considering this multidimensional character, school inclusion necessarily entails a broader cultural change in the school, where diversity is actively valued as a strength and a resource for learning, in such a way that the objective of inclusive education raises a broader reform. to the school and the educational system (Ainscow, 2020). Those schools that have an inclusive culture strive to offer greater and better learning opportunities to all their students, considering diversity as a resource and strength in the school. Therefore, diversity is redefined as an educational resource and inclusion must be the basis of quality learning, for which it is necessary to remove barriers to access, participation and achievement of students (Ainscow et al., 2012).

In this way, the Chilean experience is particularly relevant in an international context in which different organizations have pointed out the need to adopt more effective regulation to avoid the unwanted effects of the deregulated expansion of private supply on inclusion and equity, becoming in one of the first countries to adopt policies in this regard (OECD, 2004; Zancajo, 2019).

1.1 School inclusion as a large-scale reform

Since 2015, Chile has adopted a regulatory policy as part of a large-scale educational reform process that seeks to redefine the framework in which school provision is organized. Its main axes include regulating the private school sector subsidized by the State, strengthening the provision of public education and the professional teaching career (Government Program, 2013). For the first of these

purposes, a new school admission system is implemented that centralizes the allocation of tuition to schools, replaces the mandatory charging of families and prohibits profit motive in educational institutions.

The School Inclusion Law No. 20,845 was enacted in 2015 and its purpose is to ensure free access for students and their families to schools that receive state subsidies. Likewise, the principles are to respect the diversity of educational projects and actively promote the citizenship training of students, the flexibility, sustainability and comprehensiveness of learning. This new regulatory framework provides that private school supporters must organize as a non-profit legal entity to maintain the subsidy granted by the State, gradually replacing the fee to families until it is completely replaced by public financing. Educational supporters are organized as non-profit educational foundations, assuming the responsibilities and commitments acquired, such as arranging school provision, its educational purposes and those labor and pension obligations contracted with its workers.

Likewise, supporters who choose to reorganize as paid private schools stop receiving the school subsidy. This decision had to be informed to the educational community one year in advance, expressly indicating whether the establishment remains in operation (with a fee paid in full by the families) and the measures that would be adopted for this ².

On the other hand, from the point of view of school selection, the policy defines that the admission processes of establishments that receive regular contributions from the State may not consider the previous or potential school performance of the students. Likewise, it prohibits families' socioeconomic background from being requested in the admission processes. In this way, the school admission processes sought to strengthen the purpose of equity and equal opportunities, ensuring the

preferential right of whoever enjoys the guardianship of the students, to choose the school. For these purposes, a School Admission System (SAE) was created, which combines a centralized application from a single platform, with the declaration of the available enrollment of each school that receives public financing. At the time of application, families can freely define their preferences by declaring their adherence to the educational project. In this way, the application and admission processes no longer depend on the access policies that define the schools but on a centralized system that includes criteria of efficiency, social equity and planning of school provision.

The educational reform sought to ensure non-discriminatory access to the right to education at the school level, since according to the MINEDUC itself, the rules that would guarantee the right to education were being redefined through the elimination of profit, the selection of students and the co-payment made by families: “Chilean society has demanded from the State a profound paradigm shift in the educational system, leaving behind the idea of education as a consumer good that is traded in the market. A change that is based on the conviction that education is a social right” (MINEDUC, 2017, p.122).

1.2 School response patterns

The theoretical perspective suggests that educational policies are recontextualized through a complex process of interpretation and appropriation in which educational actors codify, through their practices, those initiatives promoted by regulators. In this way, policies are recontextualized in educational practice based on a negotiated process in which actors interpret, translate and must resolve the contradictions that the policy itself generates (Ball et. al. 2012), developing their own response patterns. for a context and type of practice.

The concept of school response patterns is operationalized by linking the notions of systemic change and logics of action (Woods et al., 1998; Wood, 2000; Ball and Maroy, 2008; Van Zanten, 2008). The notion of type of systemic change is defined as the way schools are linked to the institutional and structural attributes of the context in which they are located and with lasting consequences in their mode of organization and educational practice. In this sense, the notion of response generation is inherent to the market and is defined as the extent to which schools modify their practices and orientations as a consequence of changes in the regulatory context (Woods et al., 1998). At the same time, the development of responses by schools is not direct, but there are hindering elements and barriers that interact in a complex way, potentially inhibiting their ability to generate responses to the dynamic environments in which they are located.

In this perspective, there is no single response but rather a wide range of actions mediated by structural factors, such as demographic changes and the attributes of the schools themselves (their relative status or the orientation they develop towards the situation of competition). Based on this approach, the schools' responses include the processes of change that modify the stable conditions in which educational practice develops based on new institutional arrangements such as changes in administrative dependency or new forms of financing. Unlike operational responses, such as exploration and promotion, (Woods et al. 1998), these involve structural modifications in the organization of teaching, the institutional framework or funding sources. These systemic responses can be divided into substantive, structural or administrative responses, as set out in the following table:

Table 1. School systemic change trajectories

Change strategy	Guy	Description
Systemic	Administrative	Actions concerning ensuring the required budget, including the search for alternative financing to the regular student subsidy.
	Structural	Changes aimed at aspects such as institutional dependency, ownership or governance of the school.
	Noun	Actions aimed at modifying conditions in the school such as the school curriculum, admission criteria, infrastructure, management styles, etc.

Source: Own elaboration based on Woods et al., 1998 and Wood, 2000

Some of the challenges of educational provision in the face of changes in the regulatory context is that there is not a single response route since it is not limited to isolated actors, but rather to a multiplicity of intertwined instances that include schools, educational institutions and local authorities (Moschetti, 2018). Another challenge is the variability of social and institutional contexts in which schools are inserted and their influence on the way educational provision is organized. These characteristics suggest that the way in which responses are prepared from the angle of educational offer is also a complex process of negotiation between different levels inserted in a dynamic of competitive interdependence.

1.3 Cartographies of the subsidized private sector in Chile

Based on the provisions of the Shared Financing Law (1993), enacted in 1988, although it came into force in 1993, public schools can only charge co-payments to families in secondary education and with the approval of parents. However, the public schools that were integrated into this financing regime are a minority (five schools that represent 0.4% of the total enrollment of municipal establishments). For their part, 1,486 subsidized schools (48% of the enrollment of this type of establishment) charge co-payments to families, while 85% of subsidized private establishments and 82% of paid private schools declare in their legal personality that they are for-profit. until 2015 (Ubeira, 2017).

In practice, the incorporation of the family co-payment operated as an accelerator of the process of social and economic fragmentation of the educational system (Valenzuela et al., 2010). The available evidence is that its impact on educational improvement has been low, while its deepening effect on social segregation is significant, even once residential segregation is controlled (Elacqua, et al 2013; Valenzuela et al, 2010; Rojas, 2014). This mechanism has served schools to control the composition of their enrollment and a form of direct selection based on economic criteria.

As can be seen in Table 2, in the years prior to the reform (2015-2016), the number of schools is greater than in the following years, at the same time that there is an unequal distribution of co-payment brackets, focusing on sections 1 to 3 (those of smaller amounts). For the following years, the number of schools decreases and the schools tend to be distributed more homogeneously according to the sections:

Table 2. Number of schools and average collection according to tranches of shared financing period 2015-2020

Shared financing	2015		2016		2017		2018		2019		2020	
	N	USD **	N	US D	N	US D	N	US D	N	US D	N	US D
Section 1*	104	6.15	471	\$7.9	382	8.56	258	9.63	21	10.1	29	8.93
	5		8						9	5	4	
Section 2	407	21.00	319	22.0	299	22.3	288	23.7	27	24.0	25	24.4
			4		1		3		0	8	1	4
Section 3	421	41.01	381	42.6	370	44.0	301	45.3	28	46.4	22	47.4
			5		1		2		4	7	1	2
Section 4	282	83.44	239	83.7	232	83.5	190	86.2	18	87.5	12	86.5
			0		7		6		6	9	7	6
Total/average	215	25.88	141	33.3	128	35.5	103	37.9	95	39.8	89	33.8
	5		0	6	3	5	7	5	9	5	3	6

Source: Own elaboration based on MINEDUC data.

* In USD dollars: section 0= Free; section 1= \$1 to \$13; tranche 2=\$13.1 to \$32; tranche 3=\$32.1 to \$63; tranche 4=\$63.1 to \$126; section 5= More than \$126.

** Average collection to families in US dollars (USD\$).

The sustained expansion of the subsidized private sector is mainly explained by the dynamism of the for-profit subsector, which constitutes its majority component and reaches more than 85% of the schools in the sector at the end of the following decade (Corvalán et al, 2009; Elacqua et al., 2011). This has allowed not only the

withdrawal of large profits by private providers, but it is also estimated that 70% of students who attend subsidized private schools do so at for-profit schools until 2015 (Muñoz and Weinstein, 2019).

While 50% of non-profit schools declare that the seal of their educational project resides in value aspects, for-profit schools are more oriented towards attributes such as discipline and academic quality (Corvalán et al., 2009; Elacqua et al., 2011). In this sense, the non-profit sector is more directly associated with schools belonging to religious congregations: 83% assign an educational project of a confessional nature (Elacqua et al., 2011). Likewise, within the for-profit sector there is a set of schools that are part of broader conglomerates responding to corporate guidelines (16%), while the majority act autonomously, based on unique ventures.

From the point of view of academic results, these are slightly favorable for non-profit schools of a Catholic nature or belonging to large conglomerates (Elacqua et al., 2011; Contreras et al, 2011; Huneeus, 2011). Contrasted with the assessment of families, they declare a higher level of satisfaction in non-profit schools regarding dimensions such as school climate, discipline and infrastructure (Elacqua, et. al. 2011).

The above suggests that, although the end to profit as an educational policy should not by itself impact the quality of education, there are no indications that the profit incentive shows positive effects on it. It also leaves open the question about the advisability of the formation of large conglomerates that can monopolize the educational offer, violating diversity objectives. In short, the problem of profit in education has to do more directly with the type of society that is desired to be built

and what the purposes of education are in that framework (Contreras et al, 2011; Huneus, 2011).

2. Methodology

The present study proposes an exploratory-descriptive design based on quantitative data analysis (Bryman and Cramer, 2001). The unit of analysis is defined as the performance trajectories of schools in the period 2015-2020, a product of the reform introduced by the Inclusion Law, focusing on private institutions that provide a complex offering ³.

2.1 Sample

In 2015, the subsidized private sector was made up of 4,566 educational providers and a universe of 5,684 schools, which accounted for 54.5% of the system's total enrollment, being the main type of school provision in the country.

Of this universe, 4,158 schools in the sector have as their base offering school education (primary, secondary or complete cycle) as of 2015, of which 16.5% are inserted in a broader administration network (conglomerate or mega-supporters), while 83.5% constitute single-type ventures. 33.7% of the schools are concentrated in the Metropolitan Region, which represents 43.8% of the sector's enrollment.

To carry out the analysis of the schools' responses, the trajectory of each educational institution until 2020 was evaluated. To specify the size and composition of the units of analysis, cases of school closures during the period were excluded (329) and those that enter the subsidy regime with little traceability of data (51), such that the sample was made up of 3,778 subsidized private schools, which represent 66.4% of the total in the sector at the national level:

Table 3. Sample

	Schools	Tuition	Priorities to
Metropolitan	1,253	738,611	45.41
Mega holder	63	44,305	43.71
Conglomerate	170	136,481	44.31
Only	1,020	557,825	45.70
Non-Metropolitan	2,525	960,872	57.16
Mega holder	226	91,002	61.05
Conglomerate	187	105,059	52.72
Only	2,112	764,811	57.14
Grand Total	3,778	1,699,483	53.26

Source: own elaboration based on MINEDUC data.

a The classification of priority student is defined within the framework of the Preferential Subsidy (2008) that expands the public contribution to schools that receive and concentrate students who come from families in situations of social vulnerability or are part of the lowest 30% socioeconomic.

2.2 Variables and data processing

To characterize the educational policy cycle, the MINEDUC establishment directory databases were used, where it is possible to have annualized information related to establishment data, such as: i) type and levels of teaching, ii) coverage of training cycles and iii) family co-payment. The MINEDUC Open Data platform (<https://centroestudios.mineduc.cl/datos-abiertos/>) was used to extract information related to: iv) institutional dependency, v) geographical location, vi) type of

teaching and vi) enrollment according to education cycle. In this way, a panel was generated with the evolution of enrollment and other indicators of the schools between the years 2015 to 2020. The classification of priority students is used to estimate the social composition of the schools. The number of priority students and the way they are distributed between sectors and schools, which offers an estimate of the composition according to the socioeconomic condition of the families. From these initial attributes the following variables were constructed:

- Geographic context
- Type of supporter, which includes single project or two-school supporters, conglomerates between 3 to 9 schools or mega-supporters with more than 10 schools.
- Enrollment trend for the study period
- Co-payment section and monthly collection for families
- Participation of priority students in the composition of enrollment.

The analysis model is based on the typological construction of trajectories of systemic change and school restructuring, to explore the institutional responses developed by private sector schools.

The methodological approach included the design and development of a data panel that allows identifying trends that contextualize the process of replacing shared financing and the evolution of the socioeconomic selectivity profiles of schools. Then, an analysis of the decisional contexts that schools face was developed based on the review of the text and regulations of the Inclusion Law, establishing the trajectories that derive from the critical decisions that schools

adopt, and then proposing a typology of patterns of responses for the subsidized private sector.

3. Results

3.1 Typology of School Response Patterns

To develop the typology, first the critical decision scenarios posed by the regulatory policy were analyzed, the trajectories that emerge from these and finally the response areas of the schools were defined based on conditions of comparability and the dynamics of change based in the scheme proposed by Wood et. to the. (1998).

Decision level 1 includes schools that, until the reform is implemented, do not require a co-payment from families and, tend to have a less selective profile. As it is possible to establish in the review of official data, these schools may be in operation or face closure processes, giving way to the first two types of trajectories:

- a) Trajectory 1. Subsidized private school in operation that does not participate in the shared financing regime prior to the School Inclusion Law.
- b) Trajectory 2. Subsidized private school that does not participate in the shared financing regime prior to the School Inclusion Law, in the context of closure.


At Decision level 2, scenarios of exit from the shared financing regime are considered (through a path not regulated by educational policy), either from processes of closure or redefinition of private private schools that transition to exclusive financing through family payments. These types of schools are more heterogeneous although they tend to have high co-payment and selectivity:

- a) Trajectory 3. Transfer from the subsidized private sector to the non-subsidized private sector and end of shared financing.
- b) Trajectory 4. Subsidized private school that participates in the shared financing regime and faces a closure process.

Decision level 3 presents scenarios for replacing shared financing, either from the creation of new schools or the reorganization of paid private schools that transition to subsidized financing schemes. This includes both schools that are consolidating the transition to free tuition, as well as those that are in the gradual process of reducing co-payment. This scenario suggests three possible trajectories:

- a) Trajectory 5. Subsidized private school is in the process of gradually replacing the shared financing regime.
- b) Trajectory 6. Exit from the shared financing regime and consolidation of free services as subsidized private.
- c) Trajectory 7. Creation of subsidized private schools or private schools that are restructured as subsidized in the context of the educational reform between 2015 and 2020.

Below is a figure with the decisional dynamics and possible trajectories:



FFigure 1. Paths of institutional change in the private subsidized school sector

Source: self made

Based on the analysis of the decisional scenarios posed by the Inclusion Law, a typology of institutional response patterns by schools was developed. For the purposes of having a framework for comparability of response patterns, those schools that are experiencing closure processes, mergers, or that have recently been restructured as subsidized schools were excluded from the analysis⁴. The proposed proposal includes the following types:

- Restructuring, schools that respond to a type of administrative-structural change by modifying their ownership and financing scheme, moving from the subsidized private sector to the non-subsidized private regime.

- Transition, elements of substantive change with responses from schools that, given the gradual nature of the replacement of the family co-payment, do not present substantive changes during the first stage of the reform and temporarily combine financing through an expanded subsidy and contributions from families.
- Consolidation, response of schools characterized by a type of substantive change where co-payment and selection are replaced.
- Reception, response from schools that prior to the reform did not have co-payment or selectivity practices.

The typology of response to regulatory changes in educational market contexts is presented below:




Figure 2. Typology of response trajectories

Source: self made.

The horizontal differentiation axis is structured around school status zones, which are defined as symbolic attributes that schools have associated with prestige and that would be expressed in the choice preference of families. The vertical axis refers to dynamics of competition, understood either as scenarios of open competition (in contexts of open competition, schools experience greater instability and change) or scenarios of closed competition (less competition in the lower area of the plane). This conceptualization is not based on the competitive pressure that schools experience but on the dynamics of interdependence in which they are located, such that in contexts of closed competition, schools are rather assimilated to already present logics of action, where those of Low status schools have less capacity to generate responses and experience prolonged cycles of institutional deterioration, and on the other hand, high status schools display a logic of conquest of acquired positions and tend to benefit from the position already obtained, perceiving few competitors and threats. in your enviroment. It is necessary to highlight that the restructuring understood as a change of ownership and mode of financing, could move in two directions: schools that transition from the subsidy regime to exclusive financing based on the contribution of families or the opposite direction, those that are redefined as subsidized, although the latter are quantitatively smaller and with less data available (51). In the case of schools that are redefined as non-subsidized private schools, it is possible to notice a type of “selective restructuring” that is based precisely on not modifying substantive aspects of teaching, selectivity, and attempting to preserve a relationship based on status. From the point of view of enrollment composition, these schools would tend

toward increasing elitization and no longer perceive incentives to attract low-income students.

3.2 Distribution of establishments according to response patterns

Now, regarding the number of schools associated with each type of response and the enrollment of students, the following can be indicated:

Table 4. Number of schools according to type of trajectory, years 2016-2020.

Response Pattern	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Reception						1,824
Restructuring	19	eleven	74	8	1	113
Transition						856
Consolidation	309	215	258	136	67	985
Grand Total	328	226	332	144	68	3,778

Source: self made.

In the case of reception and transition responses, the change process is not limited to a specific year. During the period, 985 schools went from the shared financing regime to free as a consolidation response, 113 subsidized schools were restructured as paid private schools.

Regarding the number of students enrolled in school education, differentiated by type of response, the distribution is as follows:

Table 5. Enrollment according to type of response, years 2015-2020.

Response Pattern	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020

Reception	446,311	447,054	446,636	448,219	454,850	457,587
Restructuring	24,198	44,651	43,337	35,844	35,823	35,103
Transition	605,242	616,821	625,122	639,756	656,916	663,494
Consolidation	623,732	631,821	631,977	632,453	639,819	645,691
Grand Total	1,699,483	1,740,347	1,747,072	1,756,272	1,787,408	1,801,875

Source: self made.

Schools that originally did not have co-payment, as well as those that modify their financing, maintain their enrollment, while those schools that do not transition to the free regime increase their enrollment in the period by 9.26%. Schools facing closure processes are part of a previous cycle of deterioration and not necessarily a product of policy.

Regarding the composition of enrollment by the proportion of priority students, the following can be indicated:

Table 6. Percentage of enrollment corresponding to priority students in the years 2015-2020.

Trajectory type	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Reception	66	66.5	70.4	68.5	66.3	64.1
Restructuring	48.4	20.5	14.4	8.9	8.9	6.4
Transition	31.2	32.1	27.6	28.4	29.7	29.7

Consolidation	49.3	50.2	49.7	48.9	47.9	46.5
General average	48.7	42.3	40.5	38.6	38.2	36.6

Source: self made.

As can be seen in the previous table, establishments without shared financing (reception), or in transition to free (transition) and schools with substantive change (consolidation), vary in a small way the percentage of priority students (between 1.5 % and 2.8% between 2015 and 2020). On the other hand, schools undergoing restructuring present a reduction in the proportion of priority students, going from 48.5% to 6.4%, especially during the first years.

The types of response associated with consolidation dynamics refer to schools that have gone from the subsidy regime with charges to families to the free regime and subscribe to the SAE proposed by the Inclusion Law. Given the mechanism of gradual replacement of the co-payment proposed by the regulation, low-fee schools move more quickly in this direction, although medium-fee schools that face contexts of open competition may perceive incentives to focus on “free” in the sense to reduce status by improving its relative position with respect to other competitors and moving towards a more differentiated composition.

On the other hand, the cases of consolidation and reception are convergent, presenting a certain isomorphism with respect to the dynamics of change. However, they are situated in scenarios of differentiated status, competition and trajectories.

The reception trajectories remain stable in terms of enrollment volume and a high participation of priority students around 65% throughout the study period. The case of selective restructuring trajectories through structural change expands its

enrollment although it represents 1.5% of the sector, presenting a marked decrease in the participation of priority students, which is to be expected since financing is reorganized exclusively from of charges to families and these schools do not receive incentives associated with the school subsidy. The restructuring trajectories of medium co-pay schools substantially alter their composition by 2020. Although these dynamics are low-scale (1.5%), they account for response patterns that can exacerbate educational inequalities and exclude families that cannot pay the fees required by the new school organization.

Table 7. Characterization according to response, co-payment bracket and priority students.

	TYPE OF RESPONSES	Schools	Registration_15	Registration_20	Priorities_15	Priorities_20
	RECEPTION	1,824	446,311	457,587	66.04	64.14
	Free	1,824	446,311	457,587	66.04	64.14
	RESTRUCTURING	113	24,198	35,103	48.38	6.37
Categorization	Copay High	51	17,487	27,638	35.87	7.93
	Medium High	28	3,999	5,209	43.92	6.13
	Half	8	1,266	1,066	80.39	12.38
	(YEAH)	26	1,446	1,190	67.87	1.71
	TRANSITION	856	605,242	663,494	31.22	29.70
Copay	High	293	216,946	238,595	22.40	20.16

ay secti on	Medium High	417	303,100	335,297	33.53	33.01
	Half	129	78,106	82,958	41.81	39.85
	Low	16	6,730	6,112	46.28	36.19
	(YEAH)	1	360	532	41.94	31.58
CONSOLIDA TION		985	623,732	645,691	49.32	46.36
Cop ay secti on	High	14	4,136	5,913	49.31	45.74
	Medium High	208	110,201	116,206	43.23	38.08
	Half	523	353,765	371,582	48.58	46.23
	Low	237	154,914	151,466	56.04	54.03
	(YEAH)	3	716	524	69.74	40.30
Grand Total		3,778	1,699,483	1,801,875	53.26	49.97

Source: self made.

As indicated in the typological analysis, schools in medium and high co-payment brackets are aimed at consolidating the free school regime although the relative participation of prioritized students slightly decreases. The analysis suggests that a group of schools can benefit from competitive interdependence by consolidating free tuition, reducing status although without a more differentiated composition. From the point of view of trajectories, conglomerates and large educational providers have presented different responses during the study period with presence in the four typical scenarios. The restructuring trajectories are preferably linked to small-scale entrepreneurship supporters, selective profiles,

high status and show a more marked increase in enrollment during the period. Likewise, the transition trajectories associated with educational conglomerates show an increase in their enrollment volume. The rest of the trajectories present a stable trend regarding their participation in enrollment in the subsidized private sector.

4. Discussion

From the above, it has been possible to dimension the response patterns of schools to changes in the regulatory context, identifying trends in the way those responses are linked and give rise to new challenges for educational policy. Seven trajectories of institutional change have been identified in schools that were grouped into a typology of response with four possible patterns to the educational reform introduced by the Inclusion Law. These response patterns present differentiating characteristics and manifest a decisional process linked to the position that schools will adopt in the new scenario, which is affected by the relative status in the competitive dynamics posed by the market situation.

During the first stages of the reform, the structural characteristics of the composition of school provision (“supply”) are not modified, except for a growth trend in the private paid sector, especially in high-income communes and where there was already a well-established supply of this type.

The rearrangement that regulatory policy introduces in the educational system is systemic, enrollment shifts occur between sectors and subsectors, closure processes intensify and the rules for schools change.

In institutional contexts of high selectivity, as has been the Chilean case, schools perceive incentives to increase their selectivity practices as a way to increase their symbolic status and try to attract the preference of middle-income families. In this

sense, schools located in areas of moderate status experience greater competitive pressure, although their capacity to generate a response is lower, therefore competition is rather static and can be associated with prolonged cycles of institutional deterioration or hypersegregation.

From a substantive point of view, schools that have traditionally benefited from competition can differentiate between more or less traditionalist training although their offer is oriented towards a high-income group, which does not access the non-subsidized private offer. These types of schools will tend to perceive regulatory changes as a threat to their logic of action and tend to be linked to restructuring or transition responses.

The transition case could be assimilated to the contexts of selective restructuring or consolidation with substantive change. As a hypothesis, based on this scheme it could be suggested that the “trade off” experienced by schools in the transition cycle would consist of the fact that they could transition to consolidation scenarios, sacrificing status although improving their direct options in the dynamics of open competition.

It is observed that schools that depend more directly on the subsidy and with little response generation capacity represent 25% of enrollment and experience a destabilizing effect in a context where low and lower-middle income families can expand their boundaries of choice. . Although the net frequency of school closures does not increase compared to the years prior to the reform, this trend intensifies in those free subsidized private schools and those that do not subscribe to shared financing or do so in low amounts until 2015. In return, this co-payment replacement policy could have a stabilizing effect on those schools that previously depended more directly on family contributions.

Finally, there are signs of polarization of the educational system, which includes greater segregation at the top, especially in paid private provision, which expanded by 90% in the period analyzed, as well as in those schools that maintain forms of shared financing based on high co-payment brackets representing 36.6% of subsidized private sector tuition at the end of the study period. This finding is consistent with the trend of segmentation of schools that remain in the co-payment regime. On the other hand, there is a set of schools corresponding to single-type ventures attentive to opportunities, which enter free of charge in advance, which does not imply a reduction in school segregation, and it is plausible that in the current scenario, find benefits associated with educational policy, such as the preferential subsidy associated with priority students.

5. Conclusions

Establishing conditions for private schools that receive public financing constitutes a regulatory policy that is consistent with the trend and international evidence, since it seeks to expand family choice as a desirable objective of educational policy, and at the same time inhibits negative effects. desired outcomes of the expansion of private provision in the education system. Likewise, the experience reviewed moves from a deregulated market model to one where educational policy seeks to balance the types of school provision and includes elements of educational planning. As a whole, the revised measures tend to redefine, on the part of the State, the role and terms of collaboration with private supporters in the direction of being able to ensure minimums that favor non-discriminatory access to education, higher levels of inclusion and educational equity.

Now, it is worth asking how educational policy will advance in the perspective of this transformation and how prepared educational institutions are to address greater

social diversity, greater interaction between the political level, its local implementation and what is the way in which Schools and families recontextualize these initiatives. From this review, it is plausible to anticipate that, given the persistence of competitive incentives in the design of school provision, schools will tend to codify and generate new control strategies over the social composition of their enrollment and other attributes sensitive to families.

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